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Global Sociology and the Nature of Rights
Abstracts
Citizenship is fundamentally a western political and legal concept;
it is also a concept relevant speciﬁcally to a national polity. By
contrast human rights have been, since their formal proclamation
in 1948, promoted as universal rights. The relationship between
the social rights of national citizenship and the human rights
of the Declaration provides a useful case study in which to
discover whether sociology can provide concepts and theories
that function across conceptual boundaries and territorial borders.
Furthermore, human rights discourse may prove to be the primary
candidate for sociology to operate as an effective discourse of
global social reality. However, human rights require duties if
they are to be binding. This article considers the reformulation
of the Tobin Tax as a basis for creating human duties as a
necessary foundation for human rights.
Sociología global y la naturaleza de los derechos
La ciudadanía es fundamentalmente un concepto político y legal
occidental; es también un concepto especíﬁcamente relevante
para la política nacional. Por contraste, los derechos humanos
han sido propuestos, desde su proclamación formal en 1948,
como derechos universales. La relación entre los derechos sociales
de la ciudadanía nacional y los derechos humanos de la
Declaración proporciona un estudio de caso útil para descubrir
si la sociología puede proporcionar conceptos y teorías que 
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funcionan a través de fronteras conceptuales y territoriales. Además, el discurso de os derechos
humanos puede convertirse en el primer candidato de la sociología para operar como un discurso
efectivo de la realidad social global. Sin embargo, los derechos humanos requieren deberes si
queremos que sean efectivos. Este artículo analiza la reformulación de la Tasa Tobin como base
para la creación de deberes humanos como un fundamento necesario para los derechos humanos.
La sociologie et le caractère des droits
On pense de la citoyenneté comme un concept occidentale politique et juridique; mais elle est
aussi un concept spéciﬁquement lié à la nation. Par contre, depuis leur proclamation formelle
en 1948, les droits humains sont jugés des droits universels. Le rapport entre les droites sociales
de la citoyenneté nationale et les droits de l’homme de la déclaration fournit une étude de cas
utile dans laquelle pour découvrir si la sociologie peut fournir les concepts et les théories qui
fonctionnent à travers des frontières conceptuelles et des frontières territoriales. En outre, le
discours de droits de l’homme peut s’avérer être le candidat primaire pour que la sociologie
fonctionne comme discours efﬁcace de réalité sociale globale. Cependant, les droits de l’homme
exigent des fonctions s’ils doivent durer. En ﬁn, cet article considère la reformulation de l’impôt
de Tobin comme base pour créer des devoirs humains comme fondation nécessaire pour les
droits humains.
Global Sociology and the Nature of Rights
The citizen was closely connected historically with the rise of the European
city, civility, and civilisation. The word itself is derived from the French citeseyn,
citezein or sithezein. A citizen was originally a member of a city and, while
enjoying certain privileges, was equally burdened with obligations. Service
in the city militia and taxation were typical duties of the citizen. A citizen
was primarily a denizen of a city as a legal entity. Because the countryside
was pagan and uncivilized, pagans were lacking in urbanity. Citizens were
part of the civitas – the urban culture of the city and church. While we can
trace these components of citizenship from the Greek polis and the early
church, citizenship is most appropriately regarded as a modern concept that
ﬁrst emerged with the creation of autonomous cities in medieval Europe, but
came to maturity with modern revolutions.
It is important sociologically to treat citizenship as a product of three political
revolutions – the English Civil War, the American War of Independence and
the French Revolution. These Revolutions were the cradle of modern
nationalism and citizenship came to involve the rights and duties of a person
who is a member of a national community. The creation of European nation-
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states from the seventeenth century necessarily involved the construction of
communities which assumed the existence of, and which went a long way
to create, homogenous populations. These national communities were held
together, against the divisions of class, culture and ethnicity, by nationalistic
ideologies. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 was the origin of the modern
world system of nation-states, and state formation involved the creation of
nationalist identities on the basis of a double colonisation, both internal and
external. This process was the cultural basis for the creation of national forms
of citizenship.
The notion of citizenship spread from Europe to Japan and then on to
China. Intellectuals in both countries were inﬂuenced by a range of political
ideas from Europe in the late nineteenth century about civil society and
citizenship. Especially in China, citizenship was slow to develop and remained
connected to the idea of patrimony, benevolence and kinship. It is a citizenship
of blood or what we might call a ‘citizenship of kinsmen’. Like other empires,
China did not give rise to a notion of citizenship based on a market place of
strangers, but there was a distinctive development of ideas about citizenship
in the period 1890–1920 in which Chinese intellectuals struggled to ﬁnd a
language appropriate to the public domain that could express the ﬁrst stirrings
of modernisation. In Japan, citizenship developed with modernisation, but
remained tied to the idea of a loyal subject of the emperor. In Meiji Japan,
the sociology of Herbert Spencer had become known among both senior
government ofﬁcials and intellectuals associated with the movement of the
Liberal Democratic Right. Spencer was therefore the ﬁrst sociologist whose
works came to be translated into Japanese in Meiji and Taisho Japan from
1877 to the early twentieth century. Japanese academics and civil servants
were especially interested in his combination of evolutionary theory, utilitarian
individualism and laissez-faire economics. From Spencer, they developed the
idea of individual rights within the liberal state. With American occupation,
the new Japanese political institutions included aspects of western citizenship,
but this was essentially a top-down or passive citizenship. In other Asian
societies, the growth of citizenship has been associated with post-colonial
struggles. Indonesia – as a consequence of the national struggle against the
Japanese and Dutch in the period 1944–46 – has developed a notion of national
citizenship in the context of an emerging nationalism. Whereas Chinese and
Japanese citizenship has often been authoritarian and state dominated,
Indonesia has evolved with a clear notion of citizenship and a viable civil
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society. In conclusion, while citizenship emerged in the West, it has been
appropriated in Asian political culture.
The origins of human rights
The great expansion of human rights legislation and culture over the last
century has been a consequence of the mechanisation of warfare, the growing
number of civilian casualties in both civil and international wars, and the
horrors of biological and chemical warfare. We need to understand the growth
of human rights within a broad historical context of the idea of humanity. In
his Crimes against Humanity, Geoffrey Robertson traces the historical origins
of human rights back to a decision of the Second Lateran Council in 1139 to
prohibit the use of the crossbow in wars between Christians.1 This historical
interpretation is interesting in drawing attention to mechanical instruments
of warfare (the crossbow) and its use within a community (of Christians).
The encounter between colonial settlement and aboriginal people has been
another important setting for the emergence of rights in modern history. These
colonial conﬂicts were features of the great land rush that formed the modern
world between 1650 and 1900. One illustration was the Wounded Knee
Massacre of 1890 when between 150 and 300 men, women and children of
the Lakota Sioux people were killed by members of the US Seventh Cavalry.
This massacre, which involved the use of four Hotchkiss cannons, capable
of ﬁring ﬁfty two-pound explosive shells per minute, has all the hall marks
of what came subsequently to characterise twentieth-century violence: the
mechanisation of organised killing; revenge (for the Battle of the Little Bighorn);
ethnic cleansing, whereby the Lakota were characterised in the Nebraska State
Journal as murderous redskins; and the indiscriminate killing of women and
children. Finally the attempt by the Lakota people to secure an apology from
the United States government has not been successful.
Technological developments enhanced the capacity of states and their
military to inﬂict systematic violence on civilian populations. Hiroshima and
the Holocaust were both instances of the violent application of modern
technology against civilians. Genocide, both old and new, necessarily involves
a comprehensive denial of human rights. However in the second half of the
twentieth century, there were important transformations of warfare. There
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are three principal characteristics of new wars (Münkler, 2005). First, while
old wars were typically between nation states, new wars take place outside
the parameters of the state, that is there has been a privatisation of warfare,
made possible by the reduction in the cost of armaments. For example, the
Kalashnikov riﬂe is a relatively inexpensive but very effective weapon that
has become a basic element in ‘small wars’. The use of these cheap, portable
weapons does not require a lengthy period of training, drill and discipline.
Secondly, there is typically a signiﬁcant asymmetry between the competing
forces. Unlike the First World War where large armies engaged with each
other on a battle front over many years, in new wars small armed forces
(guerrillas or terrorists) create localised havoc, usually against civilians. Finally
Münkler perceives an ‘autonomisation’ of forms of violence that were once
subordinated to and incorporated in a military system. One indication of this
trend is that the division between criminal organization, insurgency and
warfare no longer exists. Just as terrorism is a privatisation of the military,
so the security forces that protect politicians and corporate leaders are
themselves private, proﬁtable agencies.
The ‘juridical revolution’ of the twentieth century, involving the international
recognition of human rights as formulated in the United Nations Declaration,
is a major illustration of the general process of globalization. Human rights
may be deﬁned as the entitlements of individuals qua human beings to life,
security and well being. They are said to be universal, incontrovertible and
subjective, that is individuals possess them because of their capacity for
rationality, agency and autonomy. Human rights legislation assumes that
individuals have certain fundamental powers (‘inalienable rights’) that no
political order can expunge. They are legal instruments by which governments
(or more frequently their despotic leaders) can be held criminally responsible
in international law and prosecuted in the courts for the ways in which they
mistreat their own citizens. Human rights are essentially twentieth-century
legal responses to atrocities committed against civilian populations and as a
result, where such atrocities have been witnessed by a world audience with
the spread of global communication systems, people began to think and act
as global citizens.
Citizenship versus Human Rights
Political statements about human rights and citizenship, state sovereignty
and rights are often contradictory. For example, the declaration of the National
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Assembly of France in 1789 claimed that ‘the natural and imprescriptible
rights of man’ were ‘liberty, property, security and resistance of oppression’,
but it went on to assert that ‘the nation is essentially the source of all
sovereignty’ and that no ‘individual or body of men’ could be entitled to ‘any
authority which is not expressly derived from it’. While human rights are
said to be innate and inalienable, social rights are created by states. These
two contrasted ideas – the imprescriptible rights of human beings and the
exclusive rights of citizens of sovereign nation states – have remained an
important dilemma in any justiﬁcation of rights. My argument is that the
protection offered by nation states and national citizenship is declining, and
yet the state and citizenship remain important for the enforcement of both
social and human rights.
This article is concerned to understand the differences between the social
rights of citizens and individual human rights. Social rights are entitlements
enjoyed by citizens and are enforced by courts within the national framework
of a sovereign state. These social rights, which are typically related to
corresponding duties, are ‘contributory rights’, because effective claims are
associated with contributions that citizens have made to society through work,
war (or a similar public duty), or parenting.2 A system of universal taxation
and contributions to social services through income tax are obvious indications
of social citizenship. By contrast, human rights are rights enjoyed by individuals
by virtue of being human, and as a consequence of their shared vulnerability.
Human rights are not necessarily connected to duties and they are not
contributory. There is for example no corresponding system of taxation relating
to the possession of human rights. There is as yet no formal declaration of
human duties – although there has been much discussion of such obligations.
UNESCO encouraged an initiative for a charter of the duties and responsibilities
of states, but these initiatives have yet to have much practical consequence.
The United Nations Declaration implies obligations, but they are not clearly
or forcefully speciﬁed. While states enforce social rights, there is no sovereign
power uniformly to enforce human rights at a global level.
Hannah Arendt presented a devastating criticism of ‘the Rights of Man’ in
The Origins of Totalitarianism when she observed that these inalienable rights
were supposed to exist independently of any government, but once the rights
of citizenship with the support of a government had been removed, there
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was no authority left to protect people as human beings.3 Human rights
without the support of a sovereign state, she argued, are merely abstract
claims that cannot be enforced. It is almost impossible to deﬁne what they
are or to show how they add much to the speciﬁc rights of citizens of nation
states. The right to rights only makes sense for people who are already
members of a political community. Finally she concluded bitterly and ironically
that these arguments were compatible with conservatives like Edmund Burke
who had argued that the rights of an Englishman were more secure and
deﬁnite than the abstract rights of man.
Human rights abuse is characteristically a product of state tyranny,
dictatorship, and state failure as illustrated by civil war and anarchy; a viable
state is important as a guarantee of rights. There is a valid argument therefore
that the liberties of citizens and their social rights are better protected by their
own national institutions than by external legal or political intervention. The
often chaotic outcome of human-rights interventions in East Timor and Kosovo
might force us to the conclusion that any government that can provide its
citizens with security, but with weak democracy, is to be preferred over
anarchy. The ongoing internal security crises in Central Asia, Afghanistan
and Iraq might also be added to the list of failed, or at least problematic,
interventions. From a Hobbesian perspective, a strong state is required to
enforce agreements between conﬂicting social groups. Another way of
expressing this idea is to argue that we need to maintain a distinction between
the social rights of citizens that are enforced by states, and the human rights
of persons that are protected, but frequently and inadequately enforced, by
both nation states and international institutions.
Citizenship:The Limits of the Global
There has been much discussion recently of the possibility of global citizenship
and global governance. With the growth of the European Union, sociologists
have considered the possibility of transnational citizenship. Anthropologists
have also explored the problem of identity in modern societies with the growth
of transational communities and diasporic cultures. Aihwa Ong has described
‘ﬂexible citizenship’ as ‘a strategy that combines the security of citizenship
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in a new country with business opportunities in the homeland’.4 Consequently
existing paradigms of (national) citizenship have been criticised precisely
because they cannot encompass these changes that result from globalisation.
While the sociological analysis of transnational identities is an important 
and interesting ﬁeld of research, I argue that it is ultimately obfuscating 
rather than illuminating to use the concept of citizenship to describe these
developments.
In fact citizenship can only function within the nation state, because it is
based on contributions and a reciprocal relationship between duty and rights,
unlike human rights for which there are as yet no explicit duties. To employ
the notion of citizenship outside the conﬁnes of the nation state is to distort
its meaning, indeed to render it meaningless. The idea of ﬂexible citizenship
is simply a political ﬁction. This criticism is not just a linguistic quibble. It
implies that some terms are properly national and must remain so. There are
limits to the idea of ‘sociology beyond societies’ because some concepts are
inherently not mobile, but necessarily ﬁxed and speciﬁc. It does not follow
that they are useless; it merely signiﬁes that some institutions cannot become
global. We should try to make ‘human rights’ more serviceable for international
research rather than transform the speciﬁc meaning of ‘citizenship’.
Citizenship, the rights and duties of members of a nation state, is a juridical
status that confers a socio-political identity on persons, and determines how
economic and other resources are redistributed within society. Its existence
is conﬁrmed by the provision of a passport. There are broadly speaking two
versions of the social rights that constitute citizenship. In the strong version,
citizenship is an important component of distributive justice, because it
involves a contributory principle in which there must be some balance between
an individual’s contributions to society, typically through work, military
service and parenting, and the rewards such as welfare, education and subsidies,
which such an individual might expect. The central idea behind active
citizenship is that the democratic state is an association, where membership
and its rewards are ultimately dependent on individual contributions to the
public good. In the weak version, citizen entitlements are related to needs
rather than to qualifying behaviour, individual merit or status. For example,
provision for handicapped children is a beneﬁce rather than a reward for
contributions.
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There are several possible arguments against my position. Firstly, the very
existence of dual citizenship might indicate that the relationship between
sovereignty and social rights is not as precise as I have claimed. Secondly,
there is a lack of ﬁt between duties and rights, for example in the case of
children’s rights or people with disabilities. Citizenship tends to assume a
healthy and intelligent person who is capable of undertaking civic duties, or
at least capable of gainful employment. Citizenship thus contrasts sharply
with human rights since the latter do not presuppose any relationship between
rights and duties, and make no assumptions about the mental or physical
health of people who are claimants to rights.
These hypothetical objections appear in fact to strengthen rather than
undercut my argument. Generally speaking states are reluctant to admit dual
citizenship, precisely because it creates divided loyalties and ambiguous
identities, and it is seen as a clear challenge to sovereignty. The lack of ﬁt
between rights and duties in the case of disabled persons accounts for the
fact that they are discriminated against and often treated as second-class
citizens. The elderly, while also frequently discriminated against, may be
regarded as having retrospective claims on collective resources. The absence
of a relationship between rights and duties in these cases only serves to
reinforce the notion that citizenship is a set of contributory rights. In the case
of the United States, where there has been a relatively weak development of
welfare institutions, the underlying assumption of citizenship entitlements is
nevertheless that citizens will serve in the military, pay their taxes, raise
children and generally contribute to the common good. Civil rights are not
divorced from civil duties.
Conclusion:Taxation and Global Citizenship
What solutions might be possible to this tension between the social rights of
citizens and the human rights of people as such? We can simply accept the
contradiction, and merely live with the fact that citizenship provides rights
within territorially delimited political spaces and that human rights offer
protection and security outsides these limits, especially where states have
failed to protect their own citizens. Whether these two sets of rights are in a
condition of antagonism or mutual support becomes a largely empirical
question. However, this modest answer is unlikely to be satisfactory. The real
solution is to develop human rights in terms of human duties, and then to
give these institutions signiﬁcant political authority.
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The key characteristic of the existence of citizenship in nation states is the
development of universal taxation and military subscription. A public political
space can be said to exist once citizens contribute taxes to common purposes
such as defence or education or road building or the maintenance of dykes.
When men are summonsed to defend these utilities through military service,
a state obviously exists in Max Weber’s terms. Human rights are criticised
by lawyers because they do not have these characteristics. Rights claims
appear to have no corresponding set of duties, and hence they are often said
to lack correlativity, and they are ultimately not justiciable.
In the United States, human rights are in the popular imagination seen to
be the rights of foreigners who suffer from catastrophes of various sorts –
droughts, famines and civil war. Americans by contrast have civil liberties
and civil rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution. This view replicates
the Burkean position that the rights of citizens – in his case Englishmen – are
more real than the abstract rights of universal declarations. Human rights for
many western citizens do not impinge on their everyday world and are quite
unlike the rights they enjoy as citizens. How do we make human rights more
concrete and effective?
Human-rights enforceability can be strengthened through the United Nations,
but it will realistically require greater economic commitment from the United
States and other powerful nations. We also know that the exponential growth
of NGOs in recent decades has also created a global civil society that impinges
on people’s local social reality. But the real necessity is to give ordinary people
a sense of ownership over human rights and a clear understanding of how
such global arrangements can contribute to social reform. In my view, until
people start to contribute taxes to support human rights activities, human
rights culture and institutions will continue to be remote. One model might
be the Tobin tax as a basis for creating global responsibilities.
The underlying right of a global world is what I might call a ‘right of
mobility’. Many modern rights claims are implicitly or explicitly about crossing
borders or creating new settlements – rights of migrant labour, rights to hold
a passport, rights to enter a country, rights of asylum, rights of refugees and
other rights to residence, rights to marry outside one’s group, or the right to
buy property in other societies. However, these rights to mobility do not
appear to relate to any duties of mobility. My proposal is to develop Tobin-
type taxes related to various forms of mobility. The original taxation scheme
proposed by the American economist James Tobin was to stabilise national
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governments by getting greater control over international ﬁnancial transactions.5
The original proposal was a stamp duty on foreign exchange trading. This
basic idea was expanded to include other possibilities such as a global lottery.
Tobin’s original proposal was simple but radical, and it has the overwhelming
merit of being global, but it does not reach far enough down into national
populations. It is to some extent a tax on the rich and it does not therefore
have sufﬁcient breadth. We should look towards more general and widespread
taxes on the movements of people – a tourist tax on petrol consumption or
tourist tax on air fuel, a mobility tax on people entering other countries by
the use of a passport, or a sports tax for people travelling overseas to watch
sporting events, or even internal taxes on crossing state boundaries. These
taxes would be small from the point of the individual but they could produce
a substantial resource for UN agencies in the battle on poverty, illiteracy, poor
health, pollution or civil unrest. However, the principle is that privileged
people who beneﬁt from globalisation such as tourists should contribute to
the global good.
There are obvious problems with such a global tax on human mobility.
There would be considerable consumer resistance, because there would be
arguments about getting some balance between contributions and receipts.
Americans may feel that this is yet another tax on the rich to support countries
that have failed economically or have authoritarian governments. However,
a UN global tax would also make resources available to the residents of New
Orleans as relief from losses resulting from ﬂooding and the incompetence
of their own government. American citizens of Pakistani descent might approve
of UN relief going to their relatives in north-western Pakistan after the recent
earthquake. In global terms, it would be more difﬁcult to argue that human
rights are only important when they provide a justiﬁcation for United States
intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan. The argument would be that the mobility
tax is a duty that applies in principle to everybody and that these resources
create funding to meet the needs of rights claimers everywhere. This proposal
involves a radical overhaul of the Tobin argument by a creating a ﬂat tax on
global cosmopolitanism, thereby involving large numbers of people in global
civil society.
Citizenship works partly because when people put investments into their
societies (through work, military service or parenting) they can assume that
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they have a legitimate claim on that society when they fall ill, or become
unemployed or become too old to support themselves. Their past investments
in the community can now be used to make legitimate claims on the
‘commonwealth’. They can see a connection between effort, reward and virtue.
Citizenship in this way involves an education in civic culture in which, because
I am patriotically proud of the society to which I belong, am committed to
defending its democratic culture. These relationships between individual,
ethics and politics do not exist with respect to human rights. They do not
contribute necessarily to civic education or indeed to ethics. If people started,
albeit in a modest way, to pay for their rights and to contribute through
taxation to the good common, human rights would become as more tangible
part of everyday life, people would feel involved in global projects to prevent
famine and drought, and they would start however modestly to see themselves
as global citizens. Without a global taxation system, the UN will continue to
be largely dependent on US funding and generosity. Without these changes,
human rights will be subject to the criticism that they are fake rights because
they do not correspond to duties. More importantly, the prospect of global
governance and global citizenship remain merely political fantasies.
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